We form intentions to do A because we believe doing A-the action decided upon-will attain desirable ends, and not because we believe that now intending to do A will attain desirable ends. The deliberation that explains our intentions to act, then, is simply deliberation about which actions to perform. Our intentions are not generally based on practical deliberation about which intentions to form. (Pink 1996, p. 7) In spite of the initial plausibility of the Identity thesis, Pink maintains that it is false. It is false because a justification for deciding to do A may not justify doing A. Thus, forming an intention is itself done by agents as a means to their ends. In short, Pink believes that contrary to what the Identity thesis implies, a decision is purposive.
In § §II and III of this paper, I defend the Identity thesis against Pink's attack. §II explains how an alleged counterexample to it which he develops actually supports its truth. §III makes clear why a different argument of Pink's against the Identity thesis is directed at a straw man. In addition to defending the Identity thesis, I explain in §IV why it is the case that decisions are purposive. Contrary to what Pink asserts, the truth of the Identity thesis does not imply that decisions are non-purposive in nature.
Before criticizing Pink's positions, however, I turn immediately to his treatment of deterrent intentions. While Pink is correct that a deterrent intention does not undermine the Identity thesis, he omits a positive account of why it does not. I rectify his omission.
I
Before beginning his assault on the Identity thesis, Pink first considers a challenge to it from supposed deterrent intentions, a challenge which he rejects as unsound. His treatment of deterrent intentions elucidates what is at stake with the Identity thesis.
A deterrent intention is a conditional intention which is formed for the purpose of deterring others from performing a specific action, and the justification for forming it is not a justification for the intended action. To illustrate such an intention, consider the following example
[A]t least until recently, NATO generals intended to launch nuclear strikes if the Soviets launched a (successful enough) conventional attack. Now it's very natural to suppose that the generals held this intention at least in part in order to deter the Soviets from attacking conventionally. Indeed, it is hard do see why else they should have intended retaliation which would almost certainly have been destructive to all parties. And this seems to show that the Identity thesis is false. For a desire to prevent a So-viet conventional attack is not a reason for launching a nuclear strike if the Soviets do launch a conventional attack. So if the Identity thesis is true, this desire to prevent an attack cannot be a reason for holding the conditional intention. Hence we reason as if the generals held their intention out of a desire to attain an end-preventing an attack-to which they believed the intention was efficacious, and necessary, as a means. (A mere threat to carry out such an intention, unaccompanied by the intention, would have been detected as such by the Soviets, so failing to prevent an attack.) We reason, therefore, as if intention formation were, like action proper, an end directed activity. (Pink 1991, p. 346) Pink believes that this argument against the Identity thesis from alleged deterrent intentions is unsound because the concept of deterrent intending is itself incoherent. To understand why it is, Pink summarizes what is involved in having a conditional intention. Typically, if one intends to perform an action A under certain conditions C for a certain reason R, then, when one believes that those conditions are realized, one will A (try to A) because an intention to A logically disposes one to A. Moreover, if one were to lose R as a reason for doing A under conditions C and R is the sole reason for doing A under C, then one would give up one's intention to perform A. Now, with a supposed deterrent intention, such as an intention to retaliate if attacked, one has only one reason for having the intention, namely, in order to deter. Because of this, however, one logically will never be able to retaliate (do A). This is because if the condition C obtains (namely, one is attacked), one would cease to have one's sole reason R (namely, in order to deter) for retaining the supposed intention. Without this reason, one would have to abandon one's intention to retaliate and, without this intention, one could not retaliate (except by acquiring some new reason to do so).
For illustrative purposes, consider, again, NATO and the Soviets. Supposedly, NATO has the intention to retaliate (A), if attacked by the Soviets (C) for the single reason R of deterring such an attack. If NATO's intention is real, it must be disposed to retaliate in the event of an attack by the Soviets. However, if NATO were attacked, it would necessarily lose its only reason R for intending to attack. Once attacked, NATO could no longer hold on to the intention to retaliate for the reason of preventing an attack. Because that attack had taken place, it could no longer be prevented. NATO cannot deter from happening what has already happened. Logically, the intention, had it been real, could never have been carried out because the condition under which it would have been carried out was such that, had it obtained, its obtaining would have entailed that the sole reason for having the intention no longer existed. With any genuine intention, however, a belief that the condition for performing A has obtained will lead to the performance of A. An intention to A is a commitment to A.
Therefore, NATO's supposed intention to retaliate if attacked by the Soviets in order to deter such an attack was not a real intention. NATO cannot really intend to retaliate for such a reason when it and the Soviets know that the condition for retaliation, if fulfilled, would remove that reason for intending to retaliate. Thus, the concept of a deterrent intention is incoherent.
Pink concludes his argument against deterrent intending here. Deterrent intending provides no counterexample to the Identity thesis. If his argument is sound, as I think it is, and there cannot be deterrent intending, what is going on in a case like that involving NATO and the Soviets, if it isn't an intention to retaliate if attacked conventionally? The truth of the Identity thesis helps clarify the nature of NATO's reasoning with respect to the Soviets. What NATO believes will deter the Soviets is the latter's having the belief that the former will respond nuclearly, if attacked conventionally. (For a defense of the view that it is belief which deters, see Mabbott 1939.) In order to produce this belief in the Soviets, NATO communicates to them (say, in writing or verbally, or both) that should they engage in a conventional attack, NATO will respond with nuclear weapons. Such communication is an action on NATO's part and it is hoped that this action will lead to the belief on the part of the Soviets that, if they attack, they will expose themselves to a nuclear response. In accord with the Identity thesis, the reason for performing the action of communicating such information (namely, in order to produce the appropriate belief in the Soviets) becomes the reason for deciding to communicate this information to the Soviets. If the Soviets answer that they do not believe that NATO will respond in this manner to a conventional attack, then NATO will perhaps reason that another communication to the effect that it (NATO) is serious is the best way to produce the deterrent belief in the Soviets. So, again, the reason for the action of communicating a certain message becomes the reason for intending to do so. The Identity thesis stands unscathed. In the end, if the Soviets do attack and NATO responds nuclearly, the latter will have done so for a reason, where the reason was not in order to deter the Soviets from attacking.
II
Deterrent intentions fail as a challenge to the Identity thesis. Nevertheless, Pink believes that a successful attack against the Identity thesis can be carried out. To begin such an attack, he directs our attention to the coordinating function of intention, which he thinks poses insuperable problems for the Identity thesis. Decisions are coordinatory in nature in the sense that a decision made now about what to do in the more distant future influences what will be done in the near future. By intending to perform an action in the future, agents are able to coordinate what they will do now with the performance of that action. This is because (some of) what is done in the near future is done as a means to what is intended to be done in the distant future. It would seem, then, that an agent has a reason, namely, in order to be able to coordinate what he will be doing in the near future with what he will do later, to intend to perform an action A in the distant future, without that reason being a reason for doing A in the future. Therefore, the Identity thesis is false.
To illustrate his point, Pink presents the following example
Consider the case of Dan, the risk-averse stuntman. Dan is a stuntman who needs to decide now whether in six months time he will attempt a particular stunt or not. This is because he has to organize any publicity for the stunt soon. In order to decide about publicity he needs to decide about the stunt, since he wants to avoid attempting the stunt without having organized publicity (a wasted risk) and not attempting the stunt having organized publicity (which would make him look very foolish). Either of these two most disliked eventualities would constitute a mismatch or miscoordinated pair of actions … The stunt will be risky. Because of the risks, it may well be that there is more justification for not attempting the stunt and not organising publicity about it, than there is for attempting the stunt having organized publicity for it. Let us suppose that this is the case. Does it follow that Dan has more justification for deciding not to attempt the stunt? It does not follow. We have to consider the likely efficacy of the decision as an action co-ordinator. Dan has just had a nasty accident, and he is at the moment riskaverse. Were he sure that whatever he now decided to do he would do, he would now decide as his justifications for action dictate. Dan would decide not to attempt the stunt. For Dan quite rationally holds an overall preference not to attempt the stunt and not to organise publicity for its performance. Not attempting the stunt and not organising publicity for a stunt is the preferred as well as the preferable or more justified plan. Dan is well aware, however, that within the next six months his risk aversion may wear off. There is a significant possibility (though no more) that even if he initially decided not to attempt the stunt, so that no publicity was organised, Dan might still end up preferring to attempt the stunt and attempting it. Now whatever decision concerning the stunt Dan takes today, he wants it to be one that will stick. In particular, he does not want a change of mind to occur after the opportunity to organise-or preventpublicity has passed. Such a change of mind would just produce what Dan particularly wants to avoid-a mismatch. (Pink 1996, pp. 234-35; cf Pink 1991, p. 351-2) Contrary to what Pink claims, Dan's desire to avoid a mismatch by coordinating his present activities with his future actions is not a justification for deciding to perform the stunt. Any rational agent follows the general principle of practical reason that an agent who intends an end must intend the means to that end. And this principle of practical reason does not support one particular course of action over another. Pink is led to reject the Identity thesis because he has failed to give an accurate account of means-end justification as it applies to the example of Dan. In the remainder of this section, I will rectify this failure and show how an adequate grasp of means-end justification allows us to understand the story about Dan in a way which is compatible with the truth of the Identity thesis.
As recounted in Pink's argument, Dan's current reason-giving structure justifies his not performing the stunt and, hence, forming an intention not to perform it. Dan, however, believes that in the ensuing months his reason-giving structure is going to change and he will come to have a justification to perform the stunt which he now lacks. Like any rational agent, Dan is aware that forming an intention to A is forming a commitment to do A and, thus, entails a commitment to pursue a means which is sufficient for doing A. Dan realizes that he could decide not to perform the stunt, even though he believes that his reason-giving structure is going to change to justify performing it. The question he faces is whether the present justification he has for not performing the stunt is good enough to justify his pursuance of means which will ensure that he does not perform it.
Pink notes how agents can control their future actions in atypical ways when they believe that their reason-giving structure will likely change in the future (1996, pp. 108ff) . For example, he mentions Ulysses who, once having decided to sail past the Sirens, had himself lashed to the mast so that he could not do what the reason-giving structure which he believed he would then have would justify his doing. What Pink seems to fail to realize is that Dan, once having formed the intention not to perform the stunt, could ensure that he does not perform it by reaching an agreement with others to have them lash him to a table or some other object to guarantee that he does not perform the stunt. Or, he could agree with them to have them take him out of the country so that he will not be around to perform the stunt. Or, if he believes that neither of these plans is adequate to ensure that he will not perform the stunt, and being aware of the effect his recent nasty accident had on his reason-giving structure relative to performing stunts, he could arrange with others to have them break his arms and legs in a few months so that he will not come to have a justification for performing the stunt.
The philosophical point, here, is that the issue of means-end justification and the desire to avoid a mismatch is deliberated about by Dan in light of his now having a justification not to perform the stunt and his belief that in the future he will have a justification to perform it. He will make his decision to A or not (to perform the stunt or not perform it) on the basis of his justifications for and against doing A. Dan is aware that he can avoid the unwanted mismatch of deciding not to perform the stunt and not making any plans to perform it, and then subsequently changing his mind and performing it, by now pursuing means which will ensure that he does not perform it. The question for him is whether his justification for not performing the stunt is good enough to justify pursuing these means. Or, are the means too costly? In all of his deliberation, the desire to avoid a mismatch is not a special justification for forming the intention to perform the stunt, where this is not a justification for forming the intention not to perform the stunt. Dan has the desire to avoid a mismatch however he decides. This desire is just an expression of an agent wanting his activity to be means-end coherent. In addition to this general reason which does not support one course of action over another, Dan also has different specific justifications to perform and not perform the stunt respectively. It is on the basis of those justifications alone that he will form an intention to do or not to do it. This is precisely what the Identity thesis maintains.
III
In addition to his argument involving Dan, Pink provides another consideration which supposedly falsifies the Identity thesis (Pink 1996, pp. 240-41) . As was the case with the Dan argument, this additional consideration rests on the coordinatory function of intention formation. Because they are action coordinators, decisions make it more likely that before doing A an agent will perform other actions on the assumption that he will do A, where these actions tend to increase the benefit that the agent derives from doing A. Moreover, such actions will tend to be ones which the agent will regret performing, unless he actually does A. For example, assume you book a holiday in France. In light of this action, you devote time, energy, and money, which will add to the pleasure of holidaying in France, but which will be wasted if you end up not going. Thus, forming an intention to do A later increases an agent's justification for doing A later. But it does not increase the justification for deciding to do A later. Therefore, there are justifications for doing A which are not justifications for deciding to do A.
In this case, Pink's argument is directed at a straw man. The Identity thesis does not assert that justifications for doing A which are acquired after the formation of the intention to do A become justifications for deciding to do A. Justifications do not have the capacity to motivate backwards across time. What the Identity thesis does assert, however, is that justifications for doing A which are acquired after the decision to do A do become justifications for continuing to intend to do A. Such justifications will weigh in favor of continuing to intend to do A only because they are first justifications for doing A, and they would be relevant in a situation where an agent, having decided to do A, comes to acquire justifications for not doing A and, thus, for subsequently deciding not to do A.
IV
Pink has not provided considerations which undermine the truth of the Identity thesis. Is it the case, however, as he claims, that if the Identity thesis is true, then decisions are not purposive? I think not. Contrary to what Pink asserts, decisions can be purposive and justified by the reasons which justify the decided upon action. Decisions are purposive solely in virtue of being justified by reasons. The fact that these reasons are also reasons for performing the decided upon action does not and cannot undermine the purposiveness of the decisions made for them. Why, then, does Pink claim that decisions are not purposive? He maintains this position because agents do not deliberate about how to decide but about how to act. Agents deliberate about which action to perform because they believe that doing it will attain a desirable end. In contrast, they do not believe that deciding to do A will attain a desirable end. A decision is not motivated by a belief about what end it will further. Therefore, agents do not deliberate about how to decide.
We do deliberate about how to act, not about how to decide. This fact about our deliberation, however, does not support the view that decisions are not purposive. As I indicated in the previous paragraph, decisions are made for reasons. What needs to be clarified is why, even though decisions are purposive, we do not deliberate about them. The answer lies, I believe, in a proper understanding of the function of a decision. The function of a decision is to settle on or make a commitment to a particular course of action in a situation where one has reasons supporting alternative courses of action. Because one has reasons supporting alternatives, logically one has to decide which to do. A decision is a necessary means to performing one of the actions about which one has deliberated. Functionally, a decision is the initial means to an end to which the decidedupon action is a later means. Because of a decision's functional role, it is a means to an end and, therefore, purposive.
In conclusion, decisions can be purposive and justified by the reasons which justify the decided upon action. That is, a decision is a means to the same end to which the decided upon action is a means. The purposive nature of decision making is thoroughly compatible with the truth of the Identity thesis. At least, Pink has given us no reason to think otherwise about these matters.
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